UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF VERMONT

ALICE H. ALLEN, ET AL

VS) CASE NO: 5:09-CV-230

DAIRY FARMERS OF AMERICA, INC,)

DAIRY MARKETING SERVICES,

LLC, DEAN FOODS COMPANY AND)

HP HOOD, LLC

______) FINAL FAIRNESS HEARING

BEFORE: HONORABLE CHRISTINA REISS

CHIEF JUDGE

APPEARANCES: KIT A. PIERSON, ESQUIRE

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Representing The Plaintiffs

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(APPEARANCES CONTINUED:)

DATE: July 18, 2011

TRANSCRIBED BY: Anne Marie Henry, RPR

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(The Court opened at 9:20 a.m.) 1 2 THE CLERK: Your Honor, the matter before the Court is civil case number 09-230, Alice Allen, et al versus 3 4 Dairy Farmers of America, Incorporated, et al. 5 plaintiffs are present through Attorneys Andrew Manitsky and 6 Kit Pierson. The defendants are present through attorneys 7 W. Todd Miller, Kevin Hardy, John Sartore and Paul Friedman. 8 The matter before the Court is a Final Fairness Hearing. 9 THE COURT: Good morning. 10 MR. FRIEDMAN: Good morning, Your Honor. 11 MR. PIERSON: Good morning, Your Honor. MR. MILLER: Good morning, Your Honor. 12 13 MR. HARDY: Good morning, Your Honor. 14 MR. MANITSKY: Good morning, Your Honor. 15 MR. SARTORE: Good morning, Your Honor. 16 THE COURT: My understanding, based on the filing, 17 I believe from Sunday night, is that you are not going 18 forward on the class certification hearing today. I granted 19 that unopposed motion and I will talk to you at the end of 20 this hearing about rescheduling. 21 I'm sorry for whatever medical unfortunate event 22 caused that to happen, but it's good that you could all 23 reach an agreement on that. 24 With regard to today's hearing you know that we're 25 here to discuss the Dean settlement and in terms of whether

it is fair, reasonable and adequate and whether the Court should grant a final approval. As usual I have some questions that I would like answered. I have read what you have filed. I have received the Vermont Attorney General's most recent filing, I would call it a corrective letter, and have read that.

The order I would like to proceed in is I want to hear from any individuals who came who want to speak about the settlement. And then I would hear arguments from counsel for Dean, for the plaintiff. I have ruled that the defendants do not have standing to object to the settlement as revised. If anybody wants to call any witnesses I'll ask that you bring that to my attention.

A couple of the questions I had in looking over what you have filed was whether or not the class, or proposed class I should say, was advised of the change of location to Rutland. I did notice that it was Elmwood Avenue, Burlington with a notice to go to the website for a change in location. And obviously we're here in Rutland. So I want to make sure that people were re-directed here if necessary.

I looked at the number of notices that were returned and saw the process by which they were sent out again. I'm not so sure I'm very clear to the final tally of how many notices did not reach prospective class members.

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With regard to incentive awards for class representatives that was not something that I granted preliminary approval. And I don't recall that coming into the class notice. I looked for it this morning again. not so sure that the class got notice of that. And so I want you to address whether they got notice, what the form was and, and whether or not it would be fair to add that into the settlement at this time in the event notice was not given. So those were some of the questions I had. let me start with asking if there are any individuals here, we had at least one written request who wished to speak with regard to the issue of the settlement. Yes? MR. GORTON: Yes, Your Honor. My name is Grant John Gorton. I submitted the written request. THE COURT: Does either counsel for Dean or for the plaintiffs have any objection to taking Mr. Gortman first? MR. PIERSON: Excuse me, Your Honor, I'm sorry? THE COURT: Do you have any objection to taking Mr. Gortman first? MR. PIERSON: No, not at all. MR. FRIEDMAN: No, Your Honor. THE COURT: Is anybody asking that Mr. Gortman be sworn in? We typically don't do it in this, we just allow

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    you to voice your opinion. You do it right from the podium.
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     And any request for that from counsel?
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               MR. FRIEDMAN:
                              No, Your Honor.
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               MR. PIERSON: No, Your Honor.
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               MR. GORTON: Your Honor, I requested to speak
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     because although I have accepted the settlement I have
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     several very strong concerns.
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               One of the first concerns is the fact that my
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     acceptance of the settlement would be considered approval of
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     what has happened. I've accepted the settlement only
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     because it was the best alternative. The only other
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     alternative was to continue litigation of my biggest and
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    most important and most critical client and customer against
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    me, a litigation which I did not want to happen in the first
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    place.
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               The reason I didn't want that litigation to happen
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     is because what's most important to me is to have a
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     long-term relationship with this customer.
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               THE COURT: Are you talking about Dean?
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               MR. GORTON: Dean Foods.
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               THE COURT: Dean, okay.
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               MR. GORTON:
                            Yes, Dean Foods. To put long-term
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    relationship in perspective I have been married for 40
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    years, I live in a house that was built in the 1850's, I
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     milk in a barn that was built in the 1850's.
                                                   I have four
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neighbors who are farmers. They've been friends and neighbors for 30 years spanning at least three generations. I worship in a church that I attended as a toddler and have many friends in the community whose friendships spans as many as five generations. That's long-term relationship to me.

I've been farming for 30 years. I expect my son, whose farming with me now, to farm for another 40 years.

And it's important to him to have a long-term relationship with Dean Foods.

And my understanding of long-term relationship and the potential damage that this lawsuit comes to long-term relationships is based on my non-farm experience. I'm a program manager. I have almost 20 years of experience as a program manager and working in business development for Defense Department contractors. I'm a 1971 graduate of the Naval Academy, spent nine years on active duty in the military, 12 years in the Reserves.

And my business in the program management for multi-million dollar government contracts and business development with both national and international customers has given me a very strong understanding of what business, how business relationships are developed, how important they are and what kind of damage can be done.

Dean Foods is a for profit company. Clearly, the

cost of milk is one of their most -- probably their biggest if not the biggest expense that they incur. So clearly it's in their business interests to buy milk at the lowest price that they can buy milk.

Dairy farmers, our most important income, our biggest income in fact is the price of milk. So Dean Foods wants to buy milk at a price that's maybe way down here if you would ask them. Dairy farmers want to get a price of milk that's way up here. And there has to be some agreement reached that is sustainable.

Dean Foods needs dairy farmers just as badly as we need Dean Foods. Without dairy farmers they don't have any milk to process. And what makes this problem worse is there is no definitive answer for what price should be a fair price.

I spent about four hours on the phone with Mr. Benjamin Brown of Cohen-Milstein. And his response was, well, this lawsuit, the effects of this lawsuit will not affect the business relationship between dairy farmers, it will not affect the price of milk that Dean -- the price that Dean Foods might be willing to pay for milk. And I could agree with that if there was some way to say Dean Foods and dairy farmers could say, okay, \$22.10 is the price of milk, it's the least price that we can pay and it's the price that's going to satisfy farmers so that's what we'll

pay and that number wouldn't necessarily change if there were issues or as a result of the business relationship.

But that doesn't occur. There is no -- there is no price discovery mechanism that allows either dairy farmers or Dean Foods to accurately determine that price of milk in between what they want to pay and what dairy farmers want to receive.

So it's a negotiated price, a negotiated price based on also, not just price, but quality and service. And as a negotiation the resulting price that comes out of that negotiation has, the business relationship has an important effect, potential effect on that price; an effect that far outweighs any benefit that dairy farmers will receive from this settlement.

One way that people might say, well, to determine the -- to determine a price discovery mechanism would be to have the purchase of independent milk supplies. And the problem with that is it represents a price discovery mechanism but it represents an inaccurate price discovery mechanism because it does not accurately reflect the true cost of bringing milk to the market.

The fact that one individual farmer, who might live only a few miles say from a Dean plant, and lives on a main road, and is a large farmer, and could ship a lot of milk very easily to a Dean plant, therefore, Dean could pay

him less, he could get more money does not adequately reflect the cost of serving the market in the northeast.

Every day a thousand, probably something on the order of a couple thousand milk trucks travel to five or six thousand or eight thousand farms, pick up milk and deliver that milk to something on the order of I think it's a, over a hundred plants.

The cost of doing that and making sure that each plant gets as much milk as they want and that all the farmers who produce milk have their milk picked up and delivered to a plant, which it has to be, is called balancing. In addition to balancing costs there are other, there are other associated costs besides, besides balancing. You have issues of Legislative action, you have issues of regulatory action, you have product development and you have marketing. And all of those are expenses which represent the common good of the industry. If there's Legislative action that could seriously impact dairy farmers that needs to be addressed. If there are regulatory issues such as clean water, clean air, those issues have to be addressed and it costs money to do that.

And so though all of those costs come in between the cost that Dean Foods pays for milk and the cost that dairy farmers receive. And if all farmers share in that cost all farmers share in the benefit so all farmers should

be sharing in all of those costs equally. And that's very difficult to do.

The other problem that we have very seriously is that in our industry what's good for any single one of us as an individual is bad for the common good. What's good for every single dairy farmer is to produce as much milk as that dairy farmer can produce. When we all do that it produces too much milk. Also what's good for the industry is to make sure every customer, not just Dean Foods, but every customer we have receives as much milk as they need for their plant because the end goal is to ensure that every one of us as a consumer whenever you want to walk into any store anywhere and buy any dairy product, milk, cheese, butter, whatever, that product is available in the store for you to buy.

And in order for me to do that, in order for me to make sure my customers and my customers move enough food, enough milk to get dairy products to consumers I basically have to over produce. There is no way that I can figure out exactly how much milk needs to be produced every day, exactly how much milk needs to go to consumers.

The trouble is the current system as soon as I over produce milk or the industry over produces milk the current policy of pricing in the current pricing mechanisms force my price of my milk down.

If you put the current mechanism for pricing milk

into an Excel spreadsheet you would get what Excel calls a circular reference error. It would not allow you to put the formula in the spreadsheet.

It is an undamped positive feedback system. And in addition to my business, my development and my technical expertise in the Department of the Defense is in the area of controls and monitoring. And a undamped positive feedback system is the most unstable control system that you can possibly devise.

What we really truly need is a system that will allow me, allow dairy farmers to receive a fair price, a price that's fair to consumers, a price that's fair to the people in the, in the middle, the processers and the retailers in the middle. That's what we -- that's what we really truly need. And then the excess milk that's produced could be used to help those in need.

I, if I could get a fair price for 95 percent of the milk that I produce I could afford to give away five percent of the milk I produce to help those in need. When producing that 100 percent of my milk drives my price down to an unacceptable price, a price that's below cost of production, I can't help other people.

So each one of us and this is, this issue of doing something for yourself as opposed to doing something for the common good that's not just for dairy farmers. Every single

one of us every day we get up and have to ask ourselves how much today do we do that helps us and our families versus how much we do that helps the common good or helps those in need. And that can be a very difficult -- it can be a very difficult position when doing things to help the common good hurts you because every single one of us, we have to take care of ourselves, we have to take care of our families, we have to take care of our businesses, whatever it is that we do.

And so my problem with this lawsuit and my problem with this settlement is that it does nothing to help me solve the real issues that my industry faces. And, in fact, it exacerbates those problems and promotes the potential for those problems to increase and those problems to reduce my price of milk. And that's why I do not support a 33 and a third percent fee to the lawyers.

Basically the lawyers are asking for this. I would like to pay them this. And you kind of get -- in this case you get to decide what's in the middle. And we certainly will abide by your decision. And if that's not a politically correct statement I don't know what is. But I don't envy your job, Your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: Well, thank you. It's obvious to me that you gave that a lot of thought. And I'm glad you came here to tell us your thoughts. And I'm going to ask counsel

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     to address some of those comments in your presentation.
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               MR. GORTON: You want me to stay here?
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               THE COURT: No, you are free to sit down.
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               Anybody else who wanted to speak including any
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     attorney generals for order number one, including our amicus
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     curie Vermont Attorney General?
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               All right. We will start with plaintiffs. And
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    Mr. Pierson I didn't know or Mr. Manitsky if you are going
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     to call witnesses or if you're going to make an oral
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    presentation. You've obviously filed a lot of documents.
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                             Thank you, Your Honor. We're simply
               MR. PIERSON:
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     inclined to make an oral presentation. It's my
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     understanding from conversations -- I think -- I think
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     that's how all parties are proceeding.
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               THE COURT: All right. And in addition, let me
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    know what, if anything, I know Dean Foods gave notice of
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     this, the preliminary approval and the proposed settlement
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     to all of the attorney generals in order number one.
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    have only heard from the Vermont Attorney General. Please
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     confirm for me that that is all that we've heard from.
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    Mr. Friedman?
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               MR. FRIEDMAN: That's correct, Your Honor.
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               THE COURT: All right.
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               MR. FRIEDMAN: Correct.
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               MR. PIERSON:
                             Correct, Your Honor. We have spoken
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     to some other attorney general's offices, but we have not
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     received any objections.
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               THE COURT: All right. Mr. Pierson?
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               MR. PIERSON: Good to see you, Your Honor.
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    nice to be here in Rutland.
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               THE COURT:
                           Yes.
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               MR. PIERSON: I think the last time I was here was
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     some 20 years ago when I was here with a bicycle. And it's
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     a wonderful area to bicycle in.
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               Before I start I would just like to make a couple
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     introductions, if I may. Perhaps and most importantly I
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     would like to introduce the Sitts, the two Sitts plaintiffs.
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               THE COURT: Good morning.
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               MR. PIERSON: Ralph and Garret. I also have with
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    me Mr. Manitsky, who you know. And I should mention
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    Mr. Commins who is here from the Baker-Hostetler firm.
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               THE COURT: Good morning.
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               MR. PIERSON: Mr. Cummins is here.
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               THE COURT: One of your clients has his hand up.
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               MR. SITTS: There's something I would like to
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     address the Court.
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               THE COURT: At some point certainly. Absolutely.
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               MR. PIERSON: First, I quess I would like to -- I
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     will comment on Mr. Gorton's comments during the course of
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my presentation. I would like to thank him for being here.

He's obviously an articulate and, frankly, impressive

gentleman. And his comments were well considered and

thought out.

I would comment at the outset that I think the Court should know, to get some sense of the process, my partner, Mr. Brown, did actually spend several hours on the phone over the course of three conversations with Mr. Gorton. And I don't recall if those conversations were initiated by Mr. Brown or Mr. Gorton. But they spent a lot of time talking.

And the point of those, as you no doubt gather from Mr. Gorton's comments, he's got strong opinions. And they are, they are not opinions that were lightly reached. He's an impressive guy. And the point of our conversations with him was not to persuade him that he was wrong, but it was to hear his perspective and to try to understand his perspective and to help him understand our perspective. So I just want the Court to know we took that very seriously. And even though he obviously disagrees with us in some respects I'm glad he's here today.

With regard to the preliminary approval I'm getting actually answers to some of the Court's questions, but I'll try to answer those in the context of my remarks. I'll be, I'll try to be relatively succinct here. As you

know on May 4, 2011 you granted preliminary approval of the Dean settlement. Since that time, in my view, nothing has happened that changes my view of the settlement or I think should change the Court's view of whether final approval is appropriate.

Notice was sent to more than nine thousand farmers. Notice was also published in agricultural publications directed to the farming community consistent with the Court's order. And information about the case has also been published on the website for the claims administrator.

To answer one of your questions of the nine thousand notices 201 were returned, the claims -- because of incorrect addresses. My understanding is that 10 of those were returned with a follow-up address by the postal service and the notice was then re-mailed to the corrected address.

Of the remainder Rust, whose the claims administrator, which is probably, you know, if not the leading claims admin -- they may be the leading claims administrator in the country. It's certainly on a very short list. They were able to locate, through a service they use for locating people, another 149 of the people that did not receive notice. So they've received notice.

So in terms of what the identifiable class notice here is actually I think very, very good. Probably, I

didn't exactly do the math, but it's probably 98, 99 percent. And, of course, the additional notice is provided by the publications and the internet.

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So I think it is fair to say that we've pretty much done pretty much all you can humanly do with what I would say considerable success.

Of the nine thousand notices there were only two objections. There were only four opt outs, which is really extremely low by any measure. And to some extent the Court, when we discussed this a couple months ago the Court, and I'm paraphrasing a little bit, but you essentially made the observation that one of the benefits of the notice process was it provided some reality testing because it's pretty easy for lawyers or parties to gather up people that are going to support their position, but the notice provides a way to sort of test the realities of the situation. think the fact that there have been only two objections out of more than nine thousand notices I think it tells you a I think it says a lot. I don't want to overstate what it says, but it's a significant factor in evaluating the And I think the Second Circuit, the Second settlement. Circuit makes that, makes that clear.

The one other interesting thing that I'll just comment on briefly that I think the Court should be aware of is since I was last in front of the Court I actually had the

1 opportunity to oppose, to maybe oppose, but certainly depose the head of DMS, Greg Whitcomb. And one of the interesting 2 things in Mr. Whitcomb's deposition was, and I'm 3 4 paraphrasing him as well, but I think it's a fair 5 paraphrase, he basically said he had no problem with the 30 6 million dollar settlement, that they weren't -- he had never 7 opposed that aspect of it. That um, that that, that that 8 was Dean's business and I thought it was --9 THE COURT: Well, weren't the defendants up front 10 from the start is that they never weighed in on the monetary 11 portion of the settlement? 12 MR. PIERSON: I don't really -- I disagree with 13 that in one respect, Your Honor. They had argued there was 14 a conflict relating to that and it was this whole argument 15 about counsel can't make a choice between which defendant to 16 settle with. So they had certainly -- I think -- I think it 17 is true, I mean all the affidavits that came in talked about 18 Section 9.2 of the -- none of them complained about the 19 monetary relief. And I'm going to say this -- I'm going to 20 try to answer the Court honestly. And this is not really 21 meant as a criticism of anyone at all. There was sort of a 22 lawyer created argument about a conflict, about the 23 financial position. I think it was a lawyer argument. 24 THE COURT: Well, you opened the door so I will 25 now walk through it. And I took the defendant's argument to

be by the sheer virtue of negotiating an injunctive provision that favored, in their opinion, one portion of the class over the other, the class counsel and representatives displayed a conflict of interest which made them ill-suited to represent the whole class. So that's what the argument was.

And when the injunctive relief went away in terms of this particular settlement and this class I believe that those arguments are mute. And what happens when we get to class certification I would expect that argument to be resurrected.

MR. PIERSON: Yeah, sure. And I actually think -I may have a little bit different -- I don't disagree that
they made that argument. What I think they actually argued
more than that. I think the lawyers were sort of arguing
there was a conflict with regard to the financial component
too. But what was -- what was I think significant, and I
think Mr. Whitcomb's comments about it are significant, is
that when you look at the underlying materials, and the
Court picked this up I think very quickly at the last
hearing, none of the underlying materials suggested that
there was any real opposition to the 30 million dollar
settlement. Put aside 9.2. Obviously that was at issue.

And all I'm saying about Mr. Whitcomb's testimony, and I don't mean to dwell on it because I don't think it's

much of an issue, it was significant to me when I deposed him he sort of reiterated that that was not problematic from his point of view. I don't want to overstate his testimony, but I think -- but I think that's fair.

THE COURT: Well, let me, as long as we're talking about the amount of settlement, and I agree that this case is one in which there are very few objections if you compared them against the size of the class, the Vermont Attorney General has raised the issue of the amount of the settlement in comparison to the amount of the settlement in Southeastern Milk. They conceded that they haven't analyzed the strength of the claims. They conceded that that settlement was on the eve of trial and is paid out over four years.

I have some at least thoughts of my own about the statute of limitations in that case versus this case, but they have raised that issue about is it enough without saying isn't it enough. So how about addressing some of their comments.

MR. PIERSON: Yeah, let me address that, Your
Honor. And it's a fair question for them to raise. You
know, frankly, if they hadn't raised it I was going to raise
it myself. And I wouldn't have raised it as a question, but
the Dean settlement in the Southeast I think became -- I
think the Court was notified of it Tuesday or Wednesday of

last week. So as an officer of the Court I would have discussed it with the Court whether they raised it or not.

I think there are a few things to be said about the Vermont A.G.'s letter. First, and without sounding like we invite too many objections, we do -- I'm glad to have them weigh in. I think it's good. It's good for the process. It's good for the Court. So we welcome that. And we've tried to -- I think we have a cooperative relationship with them. I think the defendants have been cooperative with them.

One thing that is important, and then I'll kind of get to the merits of the answer of the question, and I want to say that tactfully. They have a very limited understanding -- in fact they have no understanding of what the litigation in the Southeast is about. And that's not a criticism of them because they are not in the Southeast, it's not their jurisdiction. You wouldn't expect them -- you wouldn't expect them to, but, you know, the letter sort of reflects that. I mean the first letter they sent was based on the assumption that there was one order at issue. There were, in fact, two orders that are at issue. And I think the relevance of that, and they are frank about this in their letter, the relevance of that is they really have no -- they are really kind of just raising the question. And it's a legitimate question. And I'll answer it.

I think a second point that I want to make about their letter, and the Court alludes to it, is it's important to look at what the letter says and what the letter doesn't say. The letter does not object to the settlement. It does not object to the attorney fee. And, of course, and, in fact, they distinguish it from cases. They make a point that they do go into cases where those are problems and, you know, they are not shy about expressing their opinion, and they shouldn't be. And it's quite clear they have not raised an objection here. What they've done is they have, they have raised a question.

There's one other assumption in their letter, which I think is, it really requires comment, which is the assumption that the Dean settlement was a, was a pre-discovery settlement. And I do want to say a couple things about that, Your Honor, because it's, you know, frankly, it's important to me and um, and it's important to my team. You know, we were put on a discovery schedule in this case which, with the benefit of it being done, I will now thank the Court for, because it, you know, at the end of the day it serves the litigation well. And we've got issues that should move towards resolution. But I will also tell Your Honor that in almost 30 years of practice this is the toughest schedule I've had in an antitrust case in my career by some measure.

And what that -- the relevance of that to the Dean settlement is that by the time the Dean case -- by the time the settlement was negotiated in December we were on the verge of about 50, 60 depositions. And I think the cut off at that point, I don't know if it was the end of January or it was some time in February, but by the time we negotiated the settlement with Dean we had reviewed literally millions of pages of documents that had been produced in the Southeast. You know, a lot of them pertained to the Northeast and had never been reviewed for that purpose.

Honor. And that it, you know, one thing that has been I think actually highly beneficial about the case, and I give the defense counsel credit for this, I give us some credit for this too, is there's been an enormous amount of work here that has sort of gone on behind the curtain and it's because counsel has been able to litigate this case without flooding Your Honor with motions. And that, that hasn't been as a result -- it certainly hasn't been a result of capitulation from them. It hasn't been like capitulation for us either. It's reflected in, you know, dozens and dozens of hours of trying to negotiate out issues and ultimately compromising and trying to reach middle grounds. But I -- but -- but -- but the important point is that by the time we sat down, and Mr. Friedman and I sat down to see

if we could reach a resolution of this we had done -- we had done an extraordinary amount of work.

There's one other comment I want to make, Your

Honor, and it's sort of a personal comment, but I think it's important because I really want you to understand our perspective of the settlement. And then I'm going to get to the merits of what they have to say.

You know, I spent about 25 years of my career on the defense side of these cases, primarily on the defense side of these cases. And um, and it was a great professional experience in a lot of ways, but I realigned myself at the end of that on the plaintiff's side of these cases and it was because, frankly, Your Honor, to be just brutally honest with you, it was because that was where my heart was. That was who I really wanted to be representing. But when I made what was a very fundamental career decision for me one of the concerns I had about the plaintiff's bar, frankly, was that I had seen too many cases where they were too quick to settle and I didn't think it served their clients well.

And when I was speaking to my old firm and making a personal decision about making that career choice one of the questions I really wanted talked out and did talk out was that was not the way I litigate cases. I like going to trial. And I think I'm good at it. And I think there are

cases where it should be done. And I had made clear to my firm and made a commitment myself that whatever kind of plaintiff's lawyer I was going to be when I was representing victims, people that are really hurt, it was going to be a lawyer that was prepared to take cases to trial. But, but what a good lawyer does, Your Honor, is a good lawyer is prepared to take cases to trial, but a good lawyer also is prepared to settle cases when they should be settled. And that's what happened here.

So let me talk for a moment about the merits of their argument and in particular their comments about -- the questions about the Southeast.

The first comment I would like to make is that, you know, basically the question they posed is there's -- I mean, and in essence they are saying there's more milk in the northeast than the southeast so why the difference. And the first response I would make is the volume of milk is really not a metric for anything in terms of the strengths or weaknesses of the antitrust cases in these two regions.

Let me give you an example. I mean in Order 30, which is the area around Chicago and the midwest, they produce more milk, significantly more milk than they do in the northeast. That tells you nothing about whether there's an antitrust case there. It tells you nothing about the strength of an antitrust case. In fact, it's not -- in

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fact, it's not even a relevant metric of the strength of the case. So that's kind of my first answer to them is that the question you're posing is really not the relevant question.

I mean the relevant question is compare the actual substance of the cases. And that's something they really haven't done. They're simply asking the question.

So there are a couple differences that are relevant here. And they certainly were relevant to us. difference is the difference in the market share. understanding, and Mr. Cummins is here and um, who is about to go to trial in the Southeast, so he could answer this in more detail if it's helpful to the Court, Mr. Friedman is obviously familiar with it, but the plaintiff's allegation in the Southeast is that Dean -- DFA also owns a lot of processing plants in the northeast or they owned or controlled. And the allegation is through surrogates like NDH in the Southeast. And that so the market share of defendant owned and controlled, principally by Dean processing plants in the Southeast, is about 75 percent. That's the plaintiff's allegation. They will probably dispute it at trial, but that's an allegation in the Southeast. And that's magnitudes -- orders of magnitude higher than it is in the northeast.

Now, we think we got a real case in the northeast. We actually think we have a good case against DFA. But

Dean's situation in the two regions is different in a respect that is of significance.

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THE COURT: And it was one of the issues Dean raised in moving to dismiss, inadequate market share to base a claim.

MR. PIERSON: Absolutely. So that's an issue. The second issue, and um, again, I'm happy to go into it in as much detail as the Court wants, but let me give you a high level. There is conduct by Dean at issue in the, in the Southeast that is of less significance in the northeast. For example, I can just give you two examples. I mean, in other words, the conduct is not -- the allegations of wrongdoing by Dean are not the same. Frankly, there are some facts by DFA in the northeast that I think are worse in the northeast than they are in the southeast. But with regard to Dean two examples are there is a big issue down there about the spin off of the certain, of 11 processing plants to NDH. And um, the allegation in the Southeast, as I understand it, is that that was basically done and orchestrated in a way that was designed to circumvent the DOJ -- to allow the DOJ to approve other activity, acquisition activity that were going on down there. those plants, those plants were located in the southeast. There are some issues relating to NDH in the northeast, but they are relatively modest compared to the issues in the

southeast.

Another major issue of conduct in the southeast concerns an organization called the Southern Marketing Organization, which is -- it's a little bit like DMS in the south, but it just exists in the south.

And the allegation down there is that Dean forced some of the competing co-ops, basically said you want to access Dean you got to go through SMA, which was a DFA controlled entity.

So the allegation in the southeast is basically that the DFA and Dean were like that and really had a lock on a very, very substantial portion of that market. And many of those allegations, and some of the sort of crony allegation, the outflow from that, involved facts that are going on in the Southeast --

Now, there are other attorneys here that can explain it better than I can, but I think the one point that there's not really a dispute about it is that there is significant conduct that is at issue down there that isn't at issue in the northeast. It's just not -- in that sense it's not an apples to apples comparison.

Your Honor alluded to the statute of limitations.

And, you know, this is an issue which I have no doubt we're going to have a dialogue about down the road. And it's, as you know, Your Honor's wrestled with it. It's a, it's a

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complicated issue. I think you'd probably agree with me I've read a lot of the same stuff that you've read and it's a complicated issue. The case law is a little bit muddled. And, and I really think that we're right on the issue. Frankly, I think we're right vis-a-vis Dean, and the Court's earlier ruling let some of -- raised questions about the statute of limitations versus Dean. Said some stuff for the purposes of a motion to dismiss. It could go forward against Dean. It left a little bit up in the air. So we'll have time to argue about it, time to talk about that, but I think it is significant in terms of these two cases. I mean the case in the southeast was brought a couple years earlier. And the defendants have not contended there, as I understand it, and Mr. Friedman will correct me if I'm wrong, but as I understand it the defendants have not disputed that the issue of fraudulent concealment is a fact issue for the jury. So it's not that the statute of limitations issue may not be raised down there, it may or may not. It wasn't raised, as I understand it, it wasn't raised summary judgment motions in the southeast, it wasn't raised on the motion -- I don't believe it was raised on --THE COURT: I believe it was raised on the motion to dismiss. MR. PIERSON: I could be wrong about that, Your My understanding is that it has been a -- it's a, Honor.

and Mr. Cummins will correct me if I'm wrong, but I don't believe that the defendants argued in the summary judgment motions in the southeast, and they argued a lot, as you can imagine they argued a lot of things. There was a mountain of motions filed there. I don't believe that they contended that the fraudulent concealment issue could be resolved as a matter of law. I think they implicitly sort of accepted that that was a fact issue for the jury. But it's -- but it's an issue that we got to confront in the northeast. And, frankly, it was a bigger issue with regard to Dean in the northeast than I think it is with regard to DFA. So that's a difference. And not a, not a small one.

There are a couple other factors, Your Honor, about the -- I mean I think those factors by themselves I would say are the primary factors. There are a couple other things that are relevant to me and one of them may not differentiate the situation in the southeast, but it was -- it was a factor in our thinking about the settlement.

As we -- as we were discussing settlement with Dean there were issues about Dean's financial wherewithal. There were issues to me. And I don't know that all counsel agreed, but there were issues that I was concerned about. There was -- there were trade press reports that listed Dean on the short list of the companies that might not be around

in another year. And so there was an issue that if you tried to play out this case for two or three years and took the risk of appeals there might be nothing to collect at the end of the day. So that, that, that was a factor.

I think the other factor that was significant,

Your Honor, is that one thing the A.G.'s Office letter

doesn't point out, and they may have been unaware of it, the

Dean settlement, and I applaud the counsel, I mean

Baker-Hostetlet has done a great job down there. And they

should be congratulated for the settlement. But it's paid

out over a four year period.

So, you know, what that means in the Southeast is that from the date of filing, which was 1999 or 2007, until the date of the final payment, it's an eight year period for, for payment from the date the case was filed, four years of very intense litigation, and then payments right out, some payments right away. I think it's 60, 20, 20, 20 over a four year period is the way I think it works. But there's a time break from day one till the final payment of eight years. You know, in this case, this case has just been on a really different track. I mean you put our feet to the fire on the case. And um, you know, and, you know, I've said this to you before, and I'll just reiterate it, I've never been prouder of the group of colleagues that I've worked -- of the team of colleagues that I've worked with in

this case. People have -- I've been in the office all night on several occasions in which case, which I don't know about. Some of my colleagues are more youthful. I feel like I'm getting a little old for that. My kids think I'm too old for it. But, you know, we've been -- we've been in a dead sprint.

And the result of that in the case of the Dean settlement is that absent an appeal the payout from this case — the date — from the day this case was filed to that, till the payments are made is probably about a two, is about a two year period compared to eight years. And, you know, in a situation, Your Honor, where um, where farmers are experiencing what they are experiencing in Vermont, and a lot of them going out of business, I — it has always been my view of the case, even someone who loves to try cases, it has always been my view that the best result for farmers in this case is to reach a good settlement. The sooner you reach a good settlement I think it's a better outcome for farmers than letting the process run its course forever up here.

I want to be very clear, I mean, in some respects

I think one of the strongest indications of how well counsel

-- on how well the class is represented here is that, you
know, we are absolutely prepared to go to trial in this
case. In fact, frankly, at this point, at this point we're

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basically prepared to go to trial with DFA -- the soonest trial date we can get. And I understand there are other obstacles -- there are other hurdles that have to be crossed. And there's a schedule, a schedule -- but we're at the point where we're going to start pushing for the earliest trial date you'll give us.

So, you know, what you've got in terms of representation of this class, and it is relevant to the Dean settlement, is you have counsel that is absolutely prepared to do whatever they need to do to get this case ready to trial and to go to trial against defendants that are -- have vastly greater, vastly greater resources. And you see that in the work that we've done in connection with DFA. reviewed millions of documents. We've taken 70 depositions. We just gave them 300 pages of interrogatory responses. Our expert work is on track. I think the expert work is exceptionally good. You know, we are absolutely good to go. But at the same time -- and what that tells Your Honor is that this is not a class that is represented by people that are eager to settle this case at all. It's a class that's represented by people that are absolutely ready to go to trial and firmly believe that DFA has, in fact, violated the But that doesn't mean that -- but our responsibility to the class is that if there's an opportunity for a good settlement that's the best resolution of the case.

So it's -- at some respects I think if you look at our work in a broader context what you see is class counsel who are prepared to settle the case on reasonable terms, but are also prepared absolutely to go to the distance and have been sprinting for two years to accomplish that.

THE COURT: Well, as you know, the case law favors settlement. And we don't expect people to go to trial as a matter of rubato. So I understand your point, but it really isn't an either or situation for the Court. The law favors settled, settlements over litigation. But I take your point to be that if I set you a prompt trial date you would be ready to press the case forward.

MR. PIERSON: We absolutely would, Your Honor.

And, and the other point I'm making, Your Honor, and it's really not to be an expression of rubato, but I think, you know, the implicit question that the Vermont A.G.'s letter raises, and it's just a question is, you know, do we need to be concerned here that counsel, you know, was in a race to settle the case and settle it for too small amount. I mean that's kind of the implicit underlying -- maybe it is, maybe it isn't. That's kind of how I read it. And that's really the point I'm making is that, you know, this is a situation where you got real litigators who are doing what real litigators do and are absolutely ready to go to trial whenever we can get a trial date. And the settlement with

Dean was negotiated in that context by that kind of counsel. We thought it was a good settlement.

Today I think it's, you know it's really easy to judge these things for the benefit of hindsight or 20-20 vision. It's really easy to attack them. I think it's a great settlement. I think it's a really good settlement.

THE COURT: I think you may be reading too much into the letter. We can hear from the Vermont Attorney General as to what was implied. I took that to mean a realistic assessment that a case that settles on the eve of trial is likely to have a higher settlement having crossed the threshold of class certification, motion for summary judgment than a settlement in say three quarters of the way through discovery without having passed through the fire of summary judgment and not knowing what claims are going to make it to trial.

So I, I thought that was a realistic assessment that we're talking about apples and oranges in terms of when these cases settled.

MR. PIERSON: You know, Your Honor, I think that is exactly right. I mean the reality -- I mean, you know, you've been in the profession for a long time too. The reality there's a premium if you get over all those obstacles and you're on the eve of trial. And that premium can come at a cost, it comes at considerable risk, but there

is a premium.

But what the Second Circuit has said -- the Second Circuit has said that with regard to class actions the preference is that they settle so you don't actually get all the way down the road. That's the preference. And sometimes it plays out that way. But the preference is to try to reach a negotiated settlement of these things.

And so it, you know, implicit in that is, you know, I think is the view that, you know, you can't then say that a case that settles before all those hurdles are crossed, you know, that people should be penalized for that in some way or the settlement should be disparaged or criticized. I mean, you know, it's implicit in saying we hope for the judiciary and the parties that when we settle cases there's a recognition that that means that that premium from surviving all those risks may not be real. It's just a better outcome. I mean that may be another way of sort of stating what the Court's stating.

Let me comment a little bit so, on Mr. Gorton's comments. And I don't have a lot to say about him. I mean I think he's, you know, as I've said twice, he's really impressive and he is really impressive. And, you know, I hope if we've convinced the Court of anything in this case is that we're really trying to get this right. And the issues are complicated. We're just working really hard to

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get it right. And so in that context I'm glad to hear what Mr. Gorton has to say.

In terms of his, you know, he kind of makes I guess a couple points um, that I would like to comment on. You know, one point is the notion of sort of long-term relationships and gee is Dean going to retaliate against farmers and lower the price. I guess that may be a fair crystallization of it. And, you know, what I would say about that is that -- I quess I would say a couple things about this. Number one, you know, this is the view of one, of one objector. And, frankly, in terms of -- I want to answer another question Your Honor raised, which is the change in um, in location. And I know what we did in connection with that was that we contacted Mr. Gorton because he was the one -- and I can't tell you whether we, whether we contacted the other objector who just wrote a sentence or two. I just don't know the answer to that. But I do know that I told our co-counsel, and I notice, and Mr. Gorton I hope will correct me if I'm wrong, but I specifically told my colleagues call Mr. Gorton, make sure he understands the hearing's down here because I want to, you know, he was entitled to express his view. And I wanted to make sure that he knew where it was. I also told my colleagues where it was because I also wanted to make sure they would be here.

On the merits though he basically says a couple things. Um, one is this concern that, that um, that I guess that Dean will sort of retaliate and lower their prices further because they are going to be unhappy with the farmers. And what I would say about that are a couple of things. Number one, I mean Dean and DFA have been pretty tight in these cases. I mean they are all sitting at the same counsel table. I know this is not a criticism, but there's no indication -- there has been no indication of antagonism resulting from the litigation or their relative postures in all of this case.

You know, we have looked at millions of pages of Dean and DFA documents. And whatever they tell you I can represent to the Court there has been no indication of any, anywhere of Dean saying a bunch of these farmers are suing us that's the reason to try to drive the price lower nor have there been any suggestion in any of the DFA documents over the four years of litigation in the southeast or the litigation in the northeast that that is happening.

The position they've taken in their documents and in the litigation is, DFA is trying to drive down or that Dean wants to negotiate a low price. And if Mr. Gorton is suggesting that now they are going to be mad and we'll negotiate a lower price I just don't think -- I just don't think the evidence really --

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MR. PIERSON:

I think you may be reading too much into that because I think he said that we have a very complicated issue and the way farmers survive is by over producing and that's not necessarily the way to go and what I need to do is be paid a fair price. And my only regret is the Court has only so much power to affect those kinds of changes. But I didn't actually even hear him object to the amount of the settlement. His criticism was to the amount of the attorney's fees. So I would direct that -- and I actually noted Mr. Gorton to say Dean was a valued customer and no suggestion that he was concerned that Dean would retaliate against. MR. PIERSON: Well, I may not be doing justice to I mean he spoke quite a while and he spoke articulately and he expressed some complex ideas. don't mean to oversimplify and I certainly didn't mean to inaccurately state it. So, but I would like to address his point about fees because I think it's -- I think it's really a significant one as a matter of public policy. And um, let me say a couple things about that. I mean, number one, I think it is significant that there have been no other objections. THE COURT: But we had a sliding scale.

We did have a sliding scale, but the

fee petition explained -- the fee petition lays out what the fee, what the fees that we sought are. And there have been no objections to that. That's not an accurate statement.

Mr. Gorton has objected to it. But the Attorney Generals haven't. It's an issue I've discussed with the Vermont Attorney General. I've explained our perspective, our perspective on it. And they certainly haven't weighed in against the fees.

The Second Circuit law is, I would say, has a vault in a pretty clear direction. And I think it's a sensible direction. And I know how careful Your Honor reads the briefs so I'm not going to belabor that. The Second Circuit has made it I think pretty clear that the percentage method is, it's not the required method, but it's the right method in the Second Circuit. And District Courts have really evolved in that direction, not just in the Second Circuit, but I think -- but I think nationally. And there's some -- and there's some pretty compelling policy reasons for that. And they are explained in the briefs. It probably isn't worth belaboring it.

THE COURT: Let me ask you about one thing that

I'm thinking about is that 33 and a third is what plaintiffs

could expect to recover for attorney's fees should they

prevail at trial. And should it be something less than that

if the settlement is in, well in advance of trial and before

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some of those hurdles had crossed and so is there any thought in terms of adjusting it for the stage of the litigation just as we adjust the amount of the settlement for the stage of the litigation?

MR. PIERSON: Well, Your Honor, my sense of that is if you looked at it from a market point of view, you know, the typically, you know, boy the contingency fee arrangements, if you looked at it like an individual, and it's not an unfair way to look at it, and, in fact, there's some support in the Second Circuit that you really -- to view it this way the way the market would deal with contingency fee cases. But, you know, in a contingency fee case I think of this complexity in an antitrust case, you know, it would be a very normal contingency fee arrangement to provide for, you know, probably a 30 percent fee, plus expenses at the outset, you know, and maybe if the case was resolved in a month or two. But for a case that really got litigated and the percentage, you know, if to the extent --I mean often, you know, many of the contingency fee arrangements I've seen don't differentiate for the situation whether a case goes to trial or if it doesn't.

THE COURT: Some of them do.

MR. PIERSON: Some of them absolutely do. But, but I can tell you as someone, you know, who has now been doing this long enough and has seen it from the other side

there is no possibility in the market that, that plaintiff's attorneys would take this case on without an agreement that if you were going to litigate this case as hard as we've litigated it, we've invested \$13 million of time and fees in the case so far, and it continues to accumulate. And um, nobody in the marketplace would take that case on without being assured of a return of at least 30 percent regardless of whether it went to trial; 30 percent plus fees.

And, and that's not just my speculation, Your

Honor. There is evidence of that. I mean, I think, you

know, one of the important ways to view our work is, you

know, Your Honor alludes to the statute of limitations issue

and certainly some of the conduct we've been challenging has

been going on for a while.

You know, there are no individuals who have been able to pursue these claims on an individual basis. There are no other class action lawyers that stepped up. There are no law enforcement agencies that were prepared to take this on. And, frankly, most law enforcement agencies, particularly State A.G.'s Offices don't nearly have the resources to take them on.

So at one level, Your Honor, with regard to these claims, you know, the market has sort of spoken. No one else was prepared to do this, Your Honor. And, and, and, frankly, Your Honor, it's a case that absolutely should have

been brought.

And I, I mean you've seen a lot of evidence now and this is not the time or place to speak of it. The evidence is compelling. It is a case that should have been brought. And the private market was not bringing it. And I, you know, I think -- so there are a couple of points in connection with that I would like to make about fees.

First, I think it is important -- so in terms of the percentage method, you know, there is a great deal of case law, and I'm not suggesting it's every case, but there are many cases within the Second Circuit that have said 30 percent, 33 and a third percent and expenses is reasonable. One case describes it as eminently reasonable. I think we cite nine or 10 cases for that proposition. And, again, I'm not claiming that it's universal, but there is ample support for that proposition.

Secondly, what the cases say -- the way load star is primarily used now, Your Honor, as you know, this is a check, this is a double check to make sure it's not out of proportion. I mean here, you know, if the load star tells you anything it tells you that we're stupid. I mean in the sense that, you know, I mean our load star exceeds, substantially exceeds the fee that we're requesting. So, you know, not only does it -- does it not reflect a risk premium in the case where the risks and burdens are

enormous, you know, we're not even -- we're seeking an amount that's below our load star.

The other obser -- I guess there are two other observations I would like to make about the fees, Your Honor. One is that, you know, I can tell you as an officer of the Court and as somebody who has been doing this for a long, long time on, on both sides of the equation, while the fee may seem like a lot, and it is a lot, given the complexity of this litigation, this case has actually been done in an extremely efficient way. I mean it's just, this is what it takes to litigate a case like this.

My view as a litigator, and it was, you know, my partners used to get mad at me about this when I was at a big firm, I'd do big leverage cases and get big staffs together. I've always believed cases are most effectively litigated with the smallest team you can bring that's consistent with getting the work done. And that's what we've tried to do here.

So Your Honor gave us directions I think about a year ago, which was, you know, you basically -- you didn't want more than two people showing up at depositions. I think that was one. There were a number of ground rules.

And I will tell you Your Honor -- I mean I took about 10 depositions in this case in the last couple of months. And I mean it was almost a full-time job. There were a lot of

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I did the same

senior witnesses. It was more than a full-time job. know, rarely was there a second attorney there on our side. Never was there a paralegal there. You know, I went out there and did them alone, carried my own boxes and did what a real litigator ought to do. And that is what everyone on our team did. That's what Mr. Manitsky did. So not only did we not overstaff it in the way Your Honor was legitimately concerned about, we were erring in the other direction. And there was a compelling reason for that. There was a lot of work to be done and a limited amount of bodies to do it. The other observation I want to make about this, Your Honor, and I really think this is fundamental and um, this is really a benefit, I think in my perspective from being on the other side of these cases, you know, I can virtually guarantee you that -- in fact, there's no doubt in my mind that whatever resources we've devoted to prosecuting these cases the other side has devoted significantly more. Where we bring one attorney they bring two attorneys, they bring three attorneys. Where we carved out the Dean preliminary settlement there are, you know, there's the counsel for DFA, there are three other lawyer firms DFA has paid for. There's a huge dissimilarity in resources. And that's fine.

I'm not criticizing the defendants for that.

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thing when I was on the defense side. But it has a real implication, Your Honor, which is these cases cannot be brought and litigated successfully if plaintiff's counsel has to tie their hands behind their back. You know, if, if, if the way the system worked was that they can devote enormous financial resources to expert work and bringing attorneys etcetera, etcetera, and we have to devote one sixth of the resources of that the cases can't be won. So, you know, what we've done, Your Honor, and I say this as someone whose been doing it a long, long time, is we've tried to litigate the case really, really efficiently, but we've also tried to litigate it extremely well and not get crushed by the other side's resources. Your Honor, our fee petition is an expression of that, Your Honor. That's, I mean, it's simply what it takes, Your Honor. And if we want cases like this to be brought, if we want firms to be able to bring cases like this the attorneys have to be able to litigate it with some level of comparable resources to the resources the defendants bring to the table and the defendants have to be compensated for that -- the plaintiffs to have compensated for that. And, you know, at one level, I mean, you know, I'm

very sympathetic and supportive of these farmers.

know, it's, it's simply a practical necessity that attorneys

1 get well compensated for their work in a case like this. 2 And I think, you know, and so I think the short order is the case has been litigated really efficiently, 3 4 people have been working really, really hard in a dedicated 5 This is what, just what it costs. I think more 6 resources have been expended on the other side. The fee 7 requests we're making is consistent with Second Circuit law 8 and it really rewards nothing for risk in a case where the 9 risk was very high. And that's -- I'm not complaining about 10 that. That's just the way it is. But I think, Your Honor, 11 that the fee request is eminently releasable and is really, 12 you know, if we can't fully compensate attorneys for doing 13 this kind of work these cases won't be brought. And that, 14 that would really undermine a strong policy in the Second 15 Circuit and elsewhere for private enforcement of the 16 antitrust laws. 17 THE COURT: What about the incentive fees for 18 class representatives? 19 MR. PIERSON: You know, I want to check on that. 20 Can I just ask my co-counsel? I asked him to check on that. 21 THE COURT: Sure. 22 MR. PIERSON: Yeah, Your Honor, what the answer to is that um, on the website -- so what the notice -- and I 23 24 can -- I'm kind of doing this from the advice I've gotten 25 and my understanding. So if I've got it wrong I'll correct

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MR. PIERSON:

it later. But here is what my understanding is, the notice tells everybody in the class that they can get -- to get information about the case when it's posted on the website. It's on the claims administrator's website. So on the claims administrator's website we posted the fee petition including the request for the incentive fees. The request for incentive fees is quite standard. You know, I would say neither high nor low. It's just it is what it is. But all of that information is posted on the website. None of the Attorney Generals have objected to the incentive fee or the fee request. And none of -- and there's been -- there's been the one objection from Gorton. Does that answer? THE COURT: Well, my question was prefaced by didn't come at preliminary approval, the Court did not pass on it. My concern is how can you object to something that you don't know about? You've said, well, it's on the website. One of the reasons why I got involved in what the notice should say is I found some ambiguities. I thought the class should know that it wasn't a lock, that it was going to be 33 and a third, that they should be able to evaluate the range and understand it was the Court's responsibility. I don't recall even addressing the issue of incentive fees.

I mean that's a fair question, Your

1 And, and it is a fair question. And I -- I'll, you 2 know, the Court will have to, you know, the Court will obviously make a decision, but all I can tell you is that it 3 4 is -- that it's standard. I mean it's well within the norm. 5 And, you know, frankly, in a case where, you know, there's 6 an argument for a higher incentive fee, there's a real 7 In the Southeast -- in the Southeast I believe argument. 8 the preliminary approval I think it's a \$10,000 incentive 9 fee. 10 And, you know, it's a really reasonable request, 11 particularly in a case like this where, you know, these guys 12 stepped up and um, you know, took a risk in, you know, in 13 suing what is a major portion of the market. I mean you want to talk about fear of retaliation or fear of the 14 15 concerns for their livelihood. These guys really took a 16 risk. So I think, you know, it's quite -- it's quite a 17 standard and justified request. It is on the website. 18 understand the Court's point, but I do think that the 19 information is out there. And I just think it's fully appropriate in this case. 20 21 And in terms of, you know, what we're talking 22 about here, you know, it's, you know, a very modest amount 23 in terms of -- in terms of the amount at issue. 24 THE COURT: All right. And I believe your client 25 wanted to speak?

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MR. PIERSON: Can I just speak with them for a
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     moment?
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               THE COURT:
                           Yes.
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               MR. PIERSON: Your Honor, can we have a brief
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     recess?
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               THE COURT: Pardon me?
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               MR. PIERSON: With your indulgence can we ask for
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     a brief recess?
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               THE COURT: Sure. We will take, it's about time
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     for our mid-morning recess anyway. We'll take approximately
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     10 minutes. You have all day, but at 11:45 we are going to
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     exceed the courtroom to Judge Hall who is going to use it
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     for ceremonial purposes over the noon hour. If you need
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     time in the afternoon we'll have it as well.
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                             Thank you, Your Honor.
               MR. PIERSON:
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               (The Court recessed at 10:40 a.m. and resumed at
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     10:50 a.m.)
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               THE COURT: We're back on the record in Allen et
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     al versus Dairy Farmers of America, Inc., et al. And, Mr.
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     Pierson, we were in your presentation.
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               MR. PIERSON: And I appreciate your indulgence,
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     Your Honor. And there are a couple things I want to share
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     with you. And I'll try to be as quick as I can.
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               The most fundamental one is this, is that the
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     clients are really not in it for the money. I mean they --
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the damages are real and they think people should be compensated but, but what they -- the reason they stepped up and participated in this lawsuit was out of real concern for what's happening with competition in this industry and practices that they regard as illegal and we regard as illegal.

And, you know, what they hope to see in the -- at the end of the day in the litigation, and as we go forward against DFA, they really want changes in the industry that will improve the situation for everybody and help farmers get a fair deal and help farmers stay in business and help farmers get the benefit of fair competition. And that is extremely important to them. And that's what we'll be pursuing in terms of injunctive relief against DFA. And we're committed to doing that.

The other thing that I know from talking with them that I wanted to reiterate to the Court, it's something we've spoken about before, but it's also really important to them, is one of their goals in this litigation is to shed light on what's been going on in the northeast. And so a frustration that, a frustration that they've had, and it's an issue we've discussed before, is the volume of stuff that is under seal and how hard it is to sort of get all the stuff out to light.

And what, what I've communicated and committed to

them is that, you know -- and I think the Court has some sense of this, is that we're working pretty hard to try to get -- I mean there's some stuff, and we talked about it before, pricing information in the last year or two that stays under seal until the case goes to trial.

But, but our view is that the overwhelming

majority of facts in this case should be part of the public record and should be brought to light. The Vermont Attorney General has started to post some of this on the website, but, but, you know, there's a lot of talk in this case about farmers versus farmers. And I think, you know, the starting point, from our perspective, and I think the clients agree with this, is, is let people find out what the real facts are and then you may see a lot less division than is professed by the defendants.

So I just -- I hope I've communicated what you wanted me to communicate. But the point is they want to see the industry change in a way that's better for everyone. That's extremely important for them. They want the real facts to come out. And we're going to do what we need to do in this case to make sure that happens.

THE COURT: Did you want to say something yourselves? You are free to do so.

PLAINTIFF: No, Your Honor. Counsel said it. Thank you.

THE COURT: How about you, sir? Are you together then? Yes. Yes, okay. And neither of you want to say anything. You don't have to. I just wanted to make sure you have an opportunity if you want to. I know Mr. Gorton would like to respond to counsel's remarks after they've been concluded. And I think that's fine as well. That's what we're doing in a fairness hearing.

Let's turn to you Mr. Friedman.

MR. FRIEDMAN: Thank you, Your Honor. Hopefully I can be reasonably brief. I want to first comment on Mr. Gortman's remarks and what I understood him to be saying. And during the break I did have an opportunity to chat with him briefly as well. And I think, first of all, he is a very eloquent and passionate person about his concerns about the dairy industry.

The fundamental take away that I understood from him is that the mechanism for determining, discovering, establishing prices for raw milk in the dairy industry isn't working. Fundamentally, however, that pricing mechanism is a creature of federal regulation because 90 percent of the pricing is established every month by the United States Department of Agriculture using national metrics that Mr. Gortman believes, I think, don't set an appropriate fair proxy, don't have any real relationship to cost or market prices.

THE COURT: I think you've accurately summarized what I took him to be saying. My regret is over promising what the Court can do because it -- not all of this is within the Court's power.

MR. FRIEDMAN: And, and I think that's exactly right, Your Honor. Litigation is a relatively blunt instrument when it comes to addressing policy issues such as those expressed by Mr. Gortman. So I think that's where we find ourselves with respect to his valid concerns.

Let me speak to the settlement and the fairness of the settlement itself. And I think it is important to underscore that the issue before the Court is whether this settlement is fair and reasonable to the class.

And I will tell you that from my perspective and my client's perspective it's a lot of money. And it is a lot of money particularly in a case where Dean Foods continues to maintain that it has not violated the law. And there's no admission of liability here. There's no admission of liability in the Tennessee settlement. And I will talk about the differences between the two cases in a moment.

One of the things that I think bears highlighting in terms of the Court's assessment of the fairness of this resolution is in the plaintiff's memorandum in support at Page 11. And they note that the 30 million dollar payment

equals about 20 percent of the total amount of over order premiums that Dean paid to the settlement class during the class period. By any measure -- and that over order premium is the only portion of the price that is set by the parties in this lawsuit.

So, a 20 percent recovery in effect is a sur-charge that Dean is being assessed or a tax that Dean is being assessed on the prices that it paid to class members for the milk that it bought over the course of the class dispute. That's a very substantial recovery by class action standards, by antitrust jurisprudence standards. And the plaintiffs have cited a number of cases talking about recoveries that are much, much smaller. So if we just take an objective examination of what's the recovery here as a percentage of the prices that were paid it's substantial.

With respect to what went into the settlement, and it certainly is correct that there was an arm's length negotiation between the parties and both parties were fully informed. To be sure I started at a much lower number than we ended up. And they demanded a higher number than we ended up. And that's the nature of compromise.

In terms of where this case was, discovery of Dean in depositions in this case had not been taken when we settled. But, as Your Honor knows, extensive deposition discovery of Dean had been taken in the Tennessee

litigation, all of which was available to the lawyers in this case.

So the negotiations occurred in the context I think of a fully revealed record. Since the settlement there were only four additional depositions of Dean, current or former Dean employees, taken. And those, I think it's fair to say, didn't add or subtract to the knowledge that informed the decision to settle.

THE COURT: And nothing about the settlement precluded them from taking more should they have decided it was necessary?

MR. FRIEDMAN: Well, we, we had agreed that we, that they could take -- they would treat us as a third party to take up to four.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. FRIEDMAN: I don't think they would have been permitted to take more than four depositions.

It is, it is the case that the statute of limitations issue in my mind played a significant role in valuing the case. And it was a point of disagreement, frankly, between counsel as we negotiated it. But I can tell you quite frankly that my position was if you try this case against us you're going to get damages for four years, period, full stop. It's not going to go back beyond four years from when the complaint was filed. And they take a

different view, but in terms of looking at the risk in the case that was very clearly our position.

In contrast -- and the reason for that is, and you may remember, in their complaint there are no acts in furtherance of the conspiracy that are identified committed by my client that occurred within four years of the limitations period. So if they wanted to take advantage of fraudulent concealment and continuing conspiracy theory they needed to have identified something like that.

So our position, as part of negotiation, as part of an evaluation of the case was it was a four year damage period was our risk. All right. So that's one point.

The second point is that this is a case that came to a settlement negotiation and a conclusion with a fully formed or almost fully formed record from, from my client's perspective. And so we knew, and the plaintiffs knew, that the fundamental theory in the case, and it's in their interrogatory answers, their theory is that a conspiracy was hatched in 1998. That's their theory. We disagree. We don't think they can prove it, but that's their theory.

And what their expert Gordon Rausser said, and he's their expert in Tennessee, and he's their expert here, he said the conspiracy was formed in 1998, but it couldn't be implemented until the end of 2001 when Suiza and Dean merged. Rausser says that's the overt act that enabled the

parties to engage in any competitive behavior. Again, we don't agree with that, but that's his position.

Well what's significant about that in terms of evaluating the exposure in this case is that the merger between Suiza and Dean had virtually or no impact in order one. And the reason I say that is this, Legacy Dean, which was a party to the merger, had one plant in order one. That's it. So Suiza and Dean didn't increase their concentration in order one by reason of the merger.

Second point is what Professor Rausser says happened as a result of the merger is the merged entity divested 11 plants throughout the United States to this newly formed entity, NDH, National Dairy. None of the divestiture plants was in order one, not one of them. Most of them were in the southeast, not all of them, but most of them.

And according to the plaintiffs the divested plants in the hands of NDH really operated as a tool, a puppet, an entity under the control of DFA. And so the theory, according to Rausser and the plaintiffs in the southeast is that DFA controlled the processing plants that NDH owned and had a full supply agreement with Dean for its processing plants. And so the combination of those gave the so-called conspiracy control of 70 to 80 percent of bottling plant demand.

It wasn't all in Dean's hands. The experts, the plaintiff's experts say Dean, after the merger, had about, somewhere between 40 and 43 percent of the class one bottling capacity.

So let's compare that to what we have here. You heard Your Honor I think in April Mr. Pierson acknowledged that when they alleged Dean's market share in order one in their complaint they were off a bit and their best estimate now is somewhere in the mid 20 percent share.

Okay. Now, what about the rest of the processing world? Well, NDH is not a factor in the northeast. It's essentially not present as a processor. Hood has the second largest share. And it, just making sure my phone was off, Your Honor. I heard a ring in the background.

Your Honor dismissed Hood on the motion to dismiss because the plaintiffs were not able to allege facts sufficient to withstand a 12 (B) 6 standard. So there's really, from my perspective, evaluating the risk, no evidence of a processor conspiracy that is wrapping up control or access to processing plants in order one. It makes a huge difference in terms of our assessment of the risk, likelihood of plaintiff's success, likelihood of a bad outcome. So those, those facts make a huge difference in our assessment.

And then let me just turn to the procedural

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posture of the case because clearly it makes, it makes a big difference. And I will preface what I'm about to say, I'll say it once so I don't have to keep repeating it. Judge Grear in Tennessee has made a substantial number of rulings and moved the case forward. And we disagree with many of his rulings, but they are the rulings of the Court. And they put us in the posture we found ourselves last week.

So the hurdles that the plaintiffs in Tennessee passed, that have not been even crossed yet by the plaintiffs here, include class certification. And in Tennessee we petitioned for interlocutory appeal. The Sixth Circuit turned it down so they survived that. There are two pending motions to decertify the class. The Court hasn't ruled on those yet. Motions for Summary Judgment briefed, argued, decided. Three counts were dismissed, from my perspective that was great, but two counts survived. And those two counts, conspiracy in restraint of trade under Section 1 and conspiracy to monopolize in violation of Section 2, frankly, are sufficiently large to encompass everything that the plaintiffs in Tennessee were complaining about.

There were 70, don't blanch, but 70 motions in limine that were filed. The Court held argument on those over the course of two days and delivered oral rulings on many of them. So we knew -- the, the written rulings were

still coming out. But we knew that the case was going to survive with some whittling back, but largely in tact.

So we reached an agreement with the plaintiffs in Tennessee days before the final pre-trial conference knowing that they had survived all of the milestones and it was a virtual certainty that if we didn't resolve the case it was going to go to the jury with a very large damage number with substantial risk and exposure. And under those circumstances were the plaintiffs able to extract from us a larger settlement? Yes, they were. It is the nature of litigation.

So we have a situation where the risk profile of this case to my client is much lower than the risk profile of the Tennessee case. And procedurally the plaintiffs had, had crossed every milestone short of going to a jury and hear all of those milestones lay before them.

So given that I think that really addresses the question that I took the Attorney General to be asking, which is we think \$30 million seems like a fair and reasonable settlement, but we understand that there's a larger settlement in Tennessee and we'd like somebody to explain whether that causes anybody to question whether the settlement in the northeast litigation is fair. So hopefully I've answered that. If Your Honor has questions I'm happy to take them.

THE COURT: No. You have addressed it. Thank you.

MR. FRIEDMAN: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And Mr. Gorton did you want to say something further? You may do so. And then we'll let Mr. Pierson as the moving party have the last word.

MR. GORTON: Thank you, Your Honor, for the opportunity to speak again. I would like to address two or three things that were said. First off, I would like to confirm that Mr. Brown did, in fact, contact me and make sure that I knew that the venue had changed. And in all of our discussions Mr. Brown clearly was trying to understand my position and my perspective of things. He was clearly trying to articulate his perspective. And he obviously was trying to convince me of his perspective, but he made it very clear that in no way, shape or manner was he trying to prevent me or was he even encouraging me not to present my perspective. And I appreciate that very much. And I enjoyed very much the conversations with him.

A couple of other things that I would like to address. First, the issue of representation. I'm up here as a single voice. To be very honest with you when I talked to Mr. Brown, Mr. Brown actually initiated contact. He called me when he got my letter. And when I asked him and he told me that I was the only farmer who requested to speak

that was sort of a combination of scaring, daunting. And I was, I was -- in some ways I was disappointed. I really thought that maybe more farmers would be interested and willing to share their thoughts.

I think one, one big issue here is this is the busiest time of year for dairy farmers. And um, I think a lot of farmers, number one, didn't have the time and, number two, wouldn't necessarily be comfortable, while they might be happy to discuss this issue at a dairy farmer meeting or among friends and family, would feel very uncomfortable standing up here at this podium and speaking. And I am not. I give technical presentations at engineering symposiums national and international.

I would like to address a couple other things. As these lawyers said the federal -- there's this issue with the federal minimum price. And unfortunately, particularly for class one milk, the federal minimum price, in fact, bears no relationship whatsoever to what Dean Foods can sell milk for and it has no relationship whatsoever to what dairy farmers can produce milk for.

So as an indicator of what the price of milk, particularly fluid milk, should be, it is like totally worthless to all of us. And that is in good part, you know, what caused the problem. And we recognize that you as the Court can't change that. But that -- and I say that because

that's the exact emphasis of the issue of long-term relationship.

I already, I already have convinced Dean Foods to pay me an over order premium. They pay me more than they absolutely have to pay me already. And any change in that negotiation position, which could be imperceptible, I absolutely agree, you know, I'd have no thought whatsoever that Dean Foods is going to stand up tomorrow and say you dairy farmers sued me so you are not going to get an over order premium. They are not going to say that, absolutely not. They need us. We need them.

But, once again, my expertise in control and monitoring, for example, if you have a thermometer that can measure plus or minus five degrees you can't detect a change of a tenth of a degree. And a change in negotiating position that would be imperceptible even to the Dean Foods people and the DFA people who are negotiating, could more than offset the benefit of this settlement. And for me personally my share of the settlement will not even, will not even compensate me for the amount of time I have spent. I attended the preliminary hearing. I wrote a letter. I wrote this letter. I have thought long and hard about what to say at this meeting. Several times this week my wife has taken her to do list and said, John, why are you doing this? And I said, well, honey, I think it's important to my

industry so I'm doing it.

And then I would like to address the issue of representation of, representation of farmers. So I haven't had any opportunity, due to time and resources, to do any kind of like survey or anything that I could claim that has any illegitimacy. I have spoken to lots of dairy farmers. I would like to say two things.

First off, I believe in my heart that my position represents somewhere between a majority and a vast majority of dairy farmers in the northeast. And the other thing I will say that for the dairy farmers who support the idea of competition, and that would be my last remark, talk about competition, those who support that concept, the concept that this lawsuit is promoting when that drives the price of milk below cost of production, like it did in 2009, 2006 and several other times, those farmers are the first farmers to cry and shout the loudest and hardest that this system needs to be changed. And the reason for that is that competition as the single driving force is in itself destructive. I already talked about in order to really satisfy things, dairy farmers, our industry needs to over produce. When we over produce that competition forces our price down.

And the competition -- and even if it's the other way, if something happens and milk turns short, competition forces the price up. That's good for dairy farmers, but it

forces the price up, as it did in 2008, to a price that's not sustainable for them. That doesn't do me any good and it doesn't do them any good.

Just as in 2009 when it forced the price down to a level that was unsustainable for dairy farmers, yeah, instantly it was great for Dean Foods, but it's not in the long-term interest to either of us.

And the problem with competition is that competition in and of itself is a root, is a ruthless and relentless driver that moves prices one way or the other without regard to what is right. If there's a little bit of over supply it pushes prices up indiscriminate of what really should happen. If there's a little bit too much milk it pushes prices down indiscriminate of what prices should be. And that is the reason -- those are the reasons that I have the concerns that I have is that, once again, this lawsuit, this settlement does not help me in any way, shape or form to solve the real problems in my industry.

We've already heard, we've spent almost \$20 million in legal fees to get \$30 million.

I'd also like to just mention Russ Consulting.

When I got notice I had a lot of questions. I called Russ

Consulting. I got several wrong answers. I got several

nonanswers. I discussed that issue with Mr. Brown at

length. Basically if Russ Consulting were working for me on

one of my defense contracts as a program manager I would have fired them.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Mr. Pierson?

MR. PIERSON: Your Honor, I think I can be very brief. Again, I appreciate Mr. Gorton's remarks, but I do want to comment on, on one thing he said, which is, and it's really to reiterate the client's point about the importance of changes in behavior.

Mr. Gorton, I think his words were basically competition is disruptive. And, of course, he's entitled to his opinion. But DFA's antitrust complaint guidelines say they will compete fairly and prescribe certain activities, many activities that they say they will not do because they are strictly prohibited. And it's a black list of activities.

And the record in this case I think overwhelmingly shows that, in fact, that's exactly what DFA has been doing. DFA is subject to a consent decree with the United States Department of Justice in which it has both agreed and is required to compete fairly. We're going to hold them to that standard. It's a standard they've imposed for themselves. And we are going to seek relief in this case from that defendant to achieve those goals.

THE COURT: Thank you. All right. I will take this matter under advisement. I am setting myself a

deadline of approximately 30 days. The Court sets its own deadlines. It also has the power to modify them. But I'm going to try to get you a prompt response.

I want to talk to counsel for all defendants, except for Dean now, about the motion for class certification and rescheduling it. And my, my first remark is I agree that I set you a, I'll call it ambitious, and you might call it something else, discovery schedule in this case. And for the most part all deadlines have been met. If you need to extend a deadline you worked together and modified it.

There's been very limited judicial intervention in the case. I told you I would not let this become the most expensive case in the District of Vermont's history. It has not been from my perspective. And it's been well managed. Something has happened with the class certification where people are filing 273 page exhibits to this Friday afternoon. Another one is pending approval now. You should -- it's always good to think of the decision maker in what is that decision maker going to be able to digest and pursue. And nothing merits that kind of paper.

If you cannot present what you need me to know in a succinct fashion then maybe it needs to go back to the drawing board. It's literally stacks and stacks of paper.

And you know my practice is to read every single thing you

submit. But particularly lately it hasn't been a realistic view of what the judge is going to be reading Sunday night.

So I want you to be cautious about that because I want to give everything that you file my complete attention and if you are being overly inconclusive and repetitive that's not going to accomplish that.

Counsel has proposed certain dates for the hearing in rescheduling the hearing in this case. Unfortunately the Court is going through its final renovations at that point in time. I know counsel has a trial coming up in the Southeast milk case. A couple thoughts as to how to handle this. We could do it on the papers. And there certainly is a lot of them. We could reschedule the hearing and try to give you some dates in late July, knowing that everybody's probably got the summer booked, or we can do it after your trial. And I don't know when that's expected to end, but I think you chose some August, perhaps 8th and 9th were days that everybody was available. It did not really appear to work. So let's hear, let's hear first from DFA and DMS because we've made them stay silent during the case.

MR. SARTORE: Your Honor, may my group be excused?

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. SARTORE: Thank you.

MR. HARDY: Good morning, Your Honor. Kevin Hardy on behalf of DFA and DMS. And I do just want to start by

1 thanking counsel for the plaintiffs and the Court. I know I 2 speak on behalf of Mr. Kuney, we very much regret and 3 understand the inconvenience and appreciates everyone's 4 consideration. 5 THE COURT: We just hope he's well. 6 MR. HARDY: With respect to scheduling I have a 7 couple thoughts. The Court in Tennessee has advised the 8 parties that in light of its criminal docket 9 responsibilities it won't be -- we won't be in trial on 10 Mondays in that case. So one possibility is to schedule it 11 for a Monday. 12 Another possibility is that Judge Grear in Tennessee has indicated that for him the week of August 29th 13 14 he has his own scheduling issues that week. So that might 15 actually -- I don't know -- I haven't -- I don't know what 16 plaintiff's counsel's availability is then, but I know he is 17 not available at the end of July. 18 MR. PIERSON: Any of that is fine with us. 19 So that would avoid a Monday hearing MR. HARDY: 20 which has some travel logistics, but that might be one 21 candidate option. If we push it to the end of the Southeast 22 trial I regret, I think that ends up being late October, 23 which is a pretty lengthy, lengthy delay. So perhaps a 24 Monday or the week of the 29th if that would work with the

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Court's schedule.

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THE COURT: Does that work with you as well,
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     Mr. Pierson?
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               MR. PIERSON: It does. July really doesn't look
     good for me, Your Honor. I apologize for that. But pretty
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     much any time in August that's convenient for them and I'll
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    make myself available.
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               THE COURT: Well, my judicial assistant will work
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    with the two of you, we will get a date and we will reset it
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    promptly. And that gives us enough time to work with.
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     don't see why we shouldn't be able to do it.
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               MR. PIERSON: If I could make one other comment,
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     Your Honor, I don't think we would be opposed to having it
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     decided on the papers either.
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               THE COURT:
                          All right. Well, you can talk between
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     the two of you if that's what you want to do. My practice
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     is if a party asks for oral argument we generally grant that
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     request. But I offered that as a possibility because
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     certainly it has been well briefed.
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               MR. PIERSON: We'll certainly discuss that.
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               THE COURT: Anything further on this matter?
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               MR. FRIEDMAN: Nothing from us, Your Honor.
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               MR. PIERSON: No, Your Honor.
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               THE COURT:
                           Thank you.
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               MR. PIERSON:
                             Thank you.
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               (The Court recessed at 1125 a.m.)
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CERTIFICATE I, certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript, to the best of my ability, of the record of proceedings in the above entitled matter dated July 18, 2011. anne Marie Henry Anne Marie Henry, RPR Official Court Reporter